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Conclusion
A certain amount of conflict and lack of clarity is unavoidable in any court
system with an intermediate appellate court. However, the most obvious con-
clusion that can be drawn from any study of the California stop and frisk rule is
that the lack of clarity in this area is far greater than it should be. A definitive
statement is needed on at least three points.
First, under what circumstances, if at all, may an officer make stops in the
daytime or indoors? As was previously pointed out, every case which has actually
been required to decide this issue has allowed daylight and indoor stops. How-
ever, the dicta in other cases will continue to cast doubt on this point until there
is a definitive statement.
Second, must there be special circumstances which indicate danger to the
officer before he may frisk, or may he automatically frisk anyone whom he may
justifiably stop? Here the cases seem to indicate that the frisk may be automatic,
but there are apparently no cases which actually state this.
Third, what are the limits of the frisk? This note has attempted to outline
what appears from a synthesis of several cases to be the permissible extent of
the frisk. However, the cases are far from clear, and there is an apparent conflict
between some of them.
It does not appear necessary for California to follow New York's example and
enact a statute in order to make the needed definitive statement. The basic stop
and frisk rule is well established, and only the details need clarification. Tis the
state supreme court could easily do and should do at the first opportunity.
Harvey E. Henderson, Jr.*
firm conclusion. See, People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374, 219 N.E.2d
196 (1966); People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217, 219 N.E.2d 595 (1966);
People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 201 N.E.2d 32, cert. denied, 379
U.S. 978 (1964). But see, People v. Pugach, 15 N.Y.2d 65, 255 N.Y.S.2d 833, 204
N.E.2d 176 (1964).
* Member, Second Year Class.
A UNIVERSAL PRIE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
The standards of procedure for federal officers who desire to question a
suspect are defined, whereas the states, which traditionally control their own
police practices and procedures, have many and varied standards. The purpose
of this note is to discuss the effect of Miranda v. Arizona1 on this divergence,
as well as the possibility of Congressional enactment of uniform rules of pre-
arraignment procedure applicable to all the states.
1384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Federal Pre-Arraignment
The McNabb-Mallory2 Rule reqmres the exclusion of any evidence obtained
by federal officers during illegal detention of an arrested person.3 The purpose
of the rule is to insure the enforcement of the federal prompt-arraignment
statute4 and to protect the arrested person from over-zealous police practices
and other dangers of secret interrogation.
6
Under the rule it is not necessary that the confession or other evidence was
obtained through physical or psychological coercion; mere illegal detention as
sufficient to taint the evidence.r The unavailability of a commissioner does not
license all-mght interrogation.8 However, if the period of illegal detention began
after the confession was procured, it is not rendered madmissible;9 and the
fact that the arrested person is being held for one offense will not render his
confession to a different offense madmissibleO The police are allowed adequate
time for the usual procedures of booking, fmgerprmting and the like. 1
State Pre-Arraignment
Although most states have prompt-arraignment statutes similar to the federal
rule,i 2 only two have adopted the exclusionary aspect of the McNabb-Mallory
Rule.i3 The United States Supreme Court has held that the mere demal of prompt
2 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354
U.S. 449 (1957).
8 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341-42 (1943).
4 FED. R. Cium. P. 5(a)- "An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon
a complaint or any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested
person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner or before
any other nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the
laws of the United States. When a person arrested without a warrant is brought before
a commi sioner or other officer, a complaint shall be filed forthwith." Section (b) provides
that the commissioner s to inform the arrested person of his constitutional rights.
5 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943).
Old. at 344.
7 Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
8 United States v. Middleton, 344 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1965).
9 Mitchell v. United States, 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
1 oUnited States v. Cargnan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951). The suspect was committed for
assault, but confessed to a murder. The confession was admissible since the detention
was lawful. But Mr. justice Douglas, concurring in the judgment, argued that the rule
of the case would sanction the "time-honored police method for obtaining confessions
[which] is to arrest a man on one charge and use his detention for investigating
a wholly different crime." Id. at 46.
11E.g., Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957); United States v. Vita,
294 F.2d 524, 529-30 (2d Cir. 1961).
12 E.g., N.Y. CoDE Cium. Paoc. § 165 (McKinney 1958); CAL. PE.NA CoD
§ 849(a)- "When an arrest is made without a warrant by a peace officer or private
person, the person arrested, if not otherwise released, must; without unneccessary delay,
be taken before the nearest or most accessable magistrate " In case of arrest with
a warrant the arrested person "must in all cases be taken before the magistrate without
unneccessary delay." Id. at § 825. See generally Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,
584 n.26 (1961).
13 People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738 (1960). CoN-. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 54-1c (Supp. 1965).
[VOL isTHE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
arraignment is a matter of state not federal law,1 4 and the admission of evidence
obtained during prolonged detention is neither a demal of equal protection of
the laws' 0 nor of due process of law.10 Thus the complete absence of uniformity
in state pre-arraignment procedures persists' 7 as is demonstrated by a number
of state decisions' 8 some of which show the inequities which ight result from the
refusal to adopt the McNabb-Mallory Rule.19 These decisions consistently hold
that the only test for admissibility of a confession is whether or not it was
voluntary, and even though prompt arraignment is required by law, failure to
promptly arraign is merely one factor to be considered in determining the
question of voluntanness.
20
In considering the possibility that the McNabb-Mallory Rule should be applied
to the states, it is important to note carefully the advantages and disadvantages of
the rule.
Many experts in the area of crime detection and law enforcement believe
that the rule has significant drawbacks. Some believe that innumerable convic-
tions can be had only by eliciting a confession from the guilty party and by
the evidence obtained through questioning of the arrested person.21 It is also
14Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 597 n.2 (1944). See generally Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601 (1961).
1s Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 597 n.2 (1944).
16 Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951).
17 See Lafave, Detention for Investigation by the Police: An Analysis of Current
Practices, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 331; Van Pelt, The Meaning and Scope of Escobedo o.
Illinois, 38 F.R.D. 441, 459 (1965); ALI, A MODEL CoDn- or PRE-AUaAGNmENT PRocE-
DuRE art. 4, comment (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
1 8See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 590-94 n.38 (1961) for a list of
state decisions holding confessions obtained during illegal detention admissible and
state decisions refusing to apply the McNabb-Mallory Rule. Another list of state deci-
sions refusing to apply McNabb-Mallory is found in NBA~u & REED, Ca AL INTER-
iOCATIOAq AND CoNFssoNs 161 n.44 (1962).
The following are examples of cases in which the court found that the suspect
was illegally detained over a certain period of time yet admitted his confession: State
v. Jordan, 83 Ariz. 248, 320 P.2d 446 (1958) (over twenty-four hours); Moore v.
State, 229 Ark. 335, 315 S.W.2d 907 (1958) (six days); Rogers v. Superior Court, 46
Cal. 2d 3, 291 P.2d 929 (1955) (eight days); People v. Fox, 148 P.2d 424, rev'd on
other grounds, 25 Cal. 2d 330, 153 P.2d 729 (1944) (forty-eight hours); Territory v.
Aquino, 43 Hawaii 347 (1959) (five days); James v. State, 193 Md. 31, 65 A.2d 888
(1949) (mentally deficient suspect held two days); Winston v. State, 209 Miss. 799,
48 So. 2d 513 (1950) (One suspect held six days, the other one month; no preliminary
hearing); State v. Davis, 253 N.C. 86, 116 S.E.2d 365 (1960) (fifteen days); State v.
Gardner, 119 Utah 579, 230 P.2d 559 (1951) (twenty-seven days).
'9 An extreme example is Myhand v. State, 259 Ala. 415, 66 So. 2d 544 (1953).
An allegedly insane Negro defendant, aged twenty, was accused of raping a twelve year
old white girl. After the police took his clothes and some smears from his body for
evidence, they threatened to turn him over to the mob to be lynched unless he con-
fessed. The appellate court affirmed the conviction and death sentence saying that
there was no physical evidence of coercion; and that the defendant's confessions were
admissible though made during illegal detention.
20 Cases cited note 18 supra.
21 Inbau, Police Interrogtion-A Practical Necessity, 52 J. Cnm:. L., C. & P.S.
16 (1961).
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urged that offenders will not readilly admit their guilt unless they are detained
and questioned for at least several hours.22 It has been said that the McNabb-
Mallory Rule thwarts prosecution of the guilty because once a guilty man is
informed of Is rights by a court he probably will not confess.23 In many cases
then there will be insufficient evidence to obtain a conviction, and the suspect
will have to be released. Since the rule requires that all arrested persons be
quickly brought before a magistrate, the innocent arrested person is immediately
stigmatized with a criminal record.2 4 Had the police been allowed to question
bun for several hours and to hold him while checking an alibi, he might not
have been exposed to this embarrassment2 5 and might have been released with-
out the necessity of arraignment, and without the high cost to the state of
requiring court proceedings for all arrested persons.
28
The proponents of the McNabb-Mallory Rule argue that our system of law
enforcement is one of accusatonal as opposed to inquisitorial procedures, and
therefore arrest is not a proper vehicle for investigation.27 It would seem that
the police should not have the power to arrest a person and detain him indefi-
nitely on mere suspicion. The McNabb-Mallory Rule insures enforcement of the
prompt-arraignment statute and thus prevents such detention by requiring an
immediate appearance before a court, which will release the prisoner if proper
grounds are not established for the issuance of a complaint. The rule also
facilitates the enforcement of the right to bail,28 in that while a suspect is
held by the police he cannot be admitted to bail; if he is brought mumediately
before the committing officer his bail will be set at once.2 9 Detention should be
limited to a short period in light of the fact that long detention greatly increases
the risk of coercion and abuse by the police.30 When the innocent person is
held incommumcado for any length of time the implicit threat that he will be
held until he confesses becomes more and more overpowering.31 Also, a ]udicial
warning to the arrested person of his constitutional rights may be the only
effective method of guaranteeing that he will understand what his rights are.
32
Thus prompt arraignment may be a necessity if coerced confessions are to be
avoided and the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is to be
preserved.33
22 Id. at 17.
23 Wickersham, The Supreme Court and Federal Criminal Procedure, 44 CoRNEL
L.Q. 14, 21 (1958). See also Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to
Release or Charge, 50 CA, . L. REv. 11, 46 (1962).
2 4 CAL. PENAL CODE § 849(b)1 provides that where the arrested person is re-
leased without having been arraigned his record then becomes one of mere detention
not arrest.
25 Wickersham, supra note 23, at 21. See also Barrett, supra note 23, at 46.
.2 Barrett, supra note 23, at 46.
2 7 Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale, and Rescue, 47
GEo. L.J. 1, 23 (1958). See also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
28 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
29 FED. R. Cmnim. P. 5(b). See Hogan & Snee, supra note 27, at 24-25.
0 _ALI, A MoDEL CODE OF PrE-ARRAIGNmmNT PnocDunx, Reporters' Introductory
Memorandum at xxiii (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
31 Thompson, Detention After Arrest and In-Custody Investigation: Some Exclu-
sionary Principles, 1966 U. ILL. L.F 390, 409.
32 Id. at 411.
83 Id. at 410.
THASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
March, 1967]
Although the Supreme Court has held that the McNabb-Mallory Rule is not
applicable to the states,3 4 it would be but a small step to apply it.35 Perhaps
the Court has already taken this step, m Ashcraft v. Tennessee3 6 where the Court
implied that prolonged detention may be inherently coercive.37 In addition,
the Court has held that the right to counsel is required at the pre-arraignment
stage.38 Also, the fourth amendment privilege against illegal searches and seizures
which applies to the states3 9 might be applied to prevent prolonged pre-arraign-
ment detention, which could be construed as an illegal seizure of the arrested
person.
40
In Malloy v. Hogan4l the Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment pnvi-
lege against self-incrimination is applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment,42 and that the states are forbidden to resort to imprisonment to
84 See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text.
In the past various proposals have been made regarding the possibility of altering
the McNabb-Mallory Rule and applying it to the states. The most sweeping has been
that the federal procedure should be modified to outlaw all questioning by the police
until the arrested person has been taken before a committing officer. Comment, Pre-
arraignment Interrogation and the McNabb-Mallory Miasma: A Proposed Amendment
to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 68 YAiL L.J. 1003, 1031 (1959). This
would require a magistrate to be on duty at all times, which may be a small price to
pay for protecting the suspected person's rights. Id. at 1035. Justice Walter V Shaefer
of the Illinois Supreme Court suggests that all interrogation be conducted either by or
before a ]udicial officer after there has been a proper warning, saying that this would
prevent police misconduct. Shaefer, Police Interrogation and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 506, 518-21 (1966).
It has also been suggested that the state courts' refusal to apply an exclusionary
rule to confessions obtained in violation of law does not make interrogation practices
lawful. The issue is not how long interrogation may be carried on, but whether pre-
arraignment interrogation is to be permitted at all. Weisberg, Police Interrogation of
Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J. CraM. L., C. & P.S. 21, 31, 39 (1961).
On the other hand it has been urged that it would be a "dangerous experiment for
the United States Supreme Court to adopt rigid rules for police conduct throughout the
nation, given the wide range of conditions under which the criminal law is enforced."
Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REv. 411, 437
(1954).
85 Ritz, State Criminal Confession Cases: Subsequent Developments in Cases
Reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court and Some Current Problems, 19 WASH. & Lzz L.
REv. 202, 230 (1962).
36 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
87 Prolonged detention was one of several factors which led the Court to conclude
that the situation shown by the evidence was "inherently coercive." Id. at 154. See
Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33
U. CHL L. REv. 657, 667 (1966).
38 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
89 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
4 0 Traynor, supra note 37, at 679; Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in
Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483, 569 (1963). Broeder also argues that the Supreme
Court considers McNabb-Mallory to be a part of the Constitution. Cf. Ritz, Twenty-five
Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in the United States Supreme Court, 19 WASH.
LEE L. REV. 35, 68 (1962).
41378 U.S. 1 (1964).
42Id. at 6.
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compel the arrested person to answer questions that nght incrmnate hnm.43
In that case Malloy had been jailed for contempt when he refused to answer
questions of a state court-appointed referee investigating illegal gambling activi-
ties. The holding of the court may, by analogy, be applied to some cases of pre-
arraignment detention, since the purpose of such detention may be virtually the
same as the purpose for holding Malloy; namely to elicit answers to questions by
the authorities. The Malloy dissent pointed out that the decision didn fact make
the forms of federal criminal procedure applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment.44
The position of some members of the Supreme Court has long been that
McNabb-Mallory bars all confessions which are the result of both state and federal
illegal detention.45
Miranda
Miranda v. Arizona46 held that when a person is arrested or is otherwise
deprived of his freedom by the authorities, certain procedural safeguards must
be put into effect to protect the right against self-incrimmation. 47 The arrested
person must be informed of his right to remain silent, that anything he says
may be used against him, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he is indigent an attorney will be appointed for hun if he so desires.48
The arrested person must have the opportunity to exercise these rights throughout
the period of detention, but may knowingly and intelligently waive them.4 9
The Court pointed out that there has been no need for this type of decision
in the federal courts, since the arrested person has been assured of his rights
under the McNabb-Mallory Rule; ° the requirement of prompt arraignment is
"responsive to the same considerations of Fifth Amendment policy that unavoid-
ably face [the Court] now as to the states."51
Although tis decision seems in effect to go beyond the safeguards of the
McNabb-Mallory Rule, Miranda does not render moot the question of the applica-
tion of McNabb-Mallory to the states.5 2 A salient point of Miranda is that the
warnings remain in the hands of the poice53-a dubious safeguard for the arrested
person who (unless he is an experienced crimnal) is frightened and confused
43 Id. at 8.
44 Id. at 15 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
45 E.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 639 (1961) (Douglas and Black,
J.J., concurring); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 448 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
46384 U.S. 436 (1966), 19 VAiND. L. REv. 1379. See also Kamisar, A Dissent From
the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old
"Voluntartness" Test, 65 Micm. L. REv. 59 (1966).
47 384 U.S. 436, 478-79.
48 Id. at 479.
49 ibid.
o Id. at 463.
5lIbid.
52 The Court was careful to point out that McNabb-Mallory is not to be disregarded
by federal officers. Id. at 463 n.32. Therefore Miranda does not supersede McNabb-
Mallory as to federal pre-arraignment procedure, and the latter rule is still not appli-
cable to the states.
58 Id. at 478.
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by the atmosphere of the police station.54 Even if he is able to comprehend the
police warning, he might be unable to "intelligently and knowingly" waive his
rights, and therefore the advantages of a ]udicial warning, as insured by McNabb-
Mallory are still a very vital issue.
One important effect of Miranda may be to spur the state legislatures to ac-
tion in the area of pre-arraignment procedure. The police have generally been
unhappy with Miranda55 and probably would prefer a legislative gude for the
future. Such action has long been urged by those concerned with the rights
in question, and with the effectiveness of law enforcement in general.56
Police procedures have evolved in a hit-or-miss fashion, depending on each
Supreme Court decision and its requirements. 57 This has created an "atmosphere
of uncertainty"58 which leaves the police in a quandary as to what is expected
of them. The action by the courts in this field has been necessitated by the mac-
tion of the legislative branch in providing a code of pre-arraignment procedure.
The United States Supreme Court has sensed a vacuum of rules and has had
to provide these rules in a case-by-case development.59 The Court itself has said
that its decisions do not preclude the states from developing workable rules of
their own in this area.60 The Court has been criticized for not giving the legisla-
tive process a chance to react to its decisions; 61 but the states in fact have not
reacted.62 This situation led the American Law Institute to prepare A Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure.3
The Model Code
The reporters of the Model Code look upon their work as a starting point
for legislative action by the states.6 4 They believe that one of the prime advantages
to legislation in this area is that legislators are able to analyze the process from
54 Thompson, supra note 31, at 411.
55 See Life, October 21, 1966, p. 34. See generally A Symposium on the Supreme
Court and the Police 1966, 57 J. Cium. L., C. & P.S. 237 (1966).
56 Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right to Counsel:
Base Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 CoLum. L. REv. 62 (1966);
Broderick, The Supreme Court and the Police: A Police Viewpoint, 57 J. Cnmr. L.,
C. & P.S. 271 (1966); Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A.J. 1017 (1965); Herman,
The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 OMo ST. L.J. 449
(1964); Inbau, Democratic Restraints Upon the Police, 57 J. Cmm. L., C. & P.S.
265 (1966).
57 Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to Release or Charge, 50
CArAF. L. REv. 11 (1962).
58 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 45 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
59 Barrett, supra note 57; Packer, The Courts, The Police, and the Rest of Us, 57
J. Cmm. L., C. & P.S. 238, 240 (1966).60 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963).
6lFriendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALip. L. REv.
929, 930 (1965).
62 Mueller, The Law Relating to Police Interrogation Privileges and Limitations,
52 J. Cam. L., C. & P.S. 2, 11 (1961).
63ALI, A MODEL CODE OF PRE-AwmGNmENT PnocEDaFE (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1966) [heremafter cited as the MODEL CODE].
6
4 MODEL CODE: Forward at x.
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first police contact to arraignment in a systematic manner.65 This as impossible
for the courts which must rule on whatever cases happen to be brought before
them. 66 If the legislature were to deal with the subject, the police might then be
taken out of the atmosphere of uncertainty, and the courts might be spared the
task of solving many procedural questions.
6 7
A Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure is a comprehensive treatment
of procedures from investigation to court appearance. In the area of police inter-
rogation the reporters have emphasized what they believe to be one of the basic
principles of the rights of an arrested or suspected person; namely the privilege
of making an intelligent decision whether or not to cooperate with the police and
to give possibly mcrimmating evidence. 68 The reporters have taken into ac-
count all preceding decisional law and have not deviated from its requirements.
Although the draft was conceived before Miranda, the reporters, in their attempt
to arrive at adequate safeguards for the arrested person, have incorporated the
requirements of Miranda in their Model Code.
The Model Code provides for a warning to be issued by the arresting officer69
and also by a station officer as soon as the party is brought to the police station.70
If the arrest was made under a warrant there may be no questioning of the suspect
before he is brought before a magistrate, unless in the presence of counsel. 71 On
the other hand, if the arrest was made without a warrant, the reporters have
provided for a "period of preliminary screening" which is not to exceed four
hours.72 In certain circumstances the officers are allowed a "period of further
screemng," 73 but an no case is the arrested person to be held without arraignment
for more than twenty-two hours.7 4 The reporters -have allowed these screening
periods in the belief that justice will be furthered by allowing the police to
investigate before they are required to take action which will result an the filing
of a complaint against the suspect.75
The Model Code contains many other provisions76 which are meant to protect
the rights of the arrested person and at the same time encourage effective law
enforcement, including exclusionary rules comparable to McNabb-Mallory which
insure that its safeguard provisions are complied with.77
Although the Model Code satisfies the Miranda requirements, it rejects the
McNabb-Mallory Rule as presently applied an the federal courts.78 The Model
6 5 MODEL CODE Reporters' Introductory Memorandum at xviii.
66 MODEL CODE art. 4 commentary at 137. See Shaefer, Federalism and State Cnmt-
nal Procedure, 70 HAiv. L. REv. 1 (1956).6 7 The reporters also believe that when clear rules are laid down, the police will be
encouraged to become more concemd with the protection of individual rights. MODEL
CODE Reporters Introductory Memorandum at xix.
68 See MODEL CODE Reporters' Introductory Memorandum at xxiii.
69 MODEL CODE § 3.08.
70 MODEL CODE § 4.01.
7 1 MODEL CODE §§ 4.03, 4.06.
72 MODEL CODE § 4.04.
7 3 MODEL CODE § 4.04(6).
74 MODEL CODE § 4.05.
75See MODEL CODE art. 4 commentary at 132.
76 See MODEL CODE § 4.09.
77MODEL CODE art. 9 & commentary.
78 MODEL CODE art. 4 commentary at 137.
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Code adheres to the rule in cases where an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant.
In cases of non-warrant arrests the reporters have modified the federal procedure
by allowing the periods of screening. In light of the advantages of the McNabb-
Mallory Rule,79 the wisdom of these provisions for prolonged detention and
interrogation seems questionable.
Possibility of Congressional Action
Most of the legal scholars, such as the reporters of the Model Code, have
considered the problem of the universal application of a pre-arraignment proce-
dure in terms of state action only.8 0 However, in light of recent developments,
the possibility of Congressional action should be considered. Since Palko v.
Connecticut8 l there has been a series of decisions by the United States Supreme
Court in which the privileges and immunities of the first eight amendments of
the Constitution have been absorbed into the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment under those circumstances where "neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed."
82
Since many of these landmark Supreme Court cases have interpreted the
fourteenth amendment to include pre-arraignment procedural nghts,83 it is
possible that Congress may now enact under the power of the fourteenth amend-
ment a Uniform Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure applicable to the states
without fear of judicial disapproval.84
The fifth clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that "the Congress
shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article."8s Legislation is appropriate if it is "plainly adapted to constitutional
and legitimate ends; laws not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and
spirit of the Constitution; law really calculated to effect objects entrusted to the
government."
8 6
70 See notes 27-33 supra and accompanying text.
80 The reporters recognized that state action would be through either legislation or
promulgation of rules of court. MoDEL CODE Reporters' Introductory Memorandum at
xvilt
81302 U.S. 319 (1937).
82 Id. at 326.
83 E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (evidence obtained by illegal searches
and seizures inadmissible); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (the fourteenth
amendment protects the privilege against self-incrimination); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964) (right to counsel assured at pre-arraignment stage).84 Dowling, Escobedo and Beyond: The Need For a Fourteenth Amendment Code
of Criminal Procedure, 56 J. Cium. L., C. & P.S. 143, 152, 156 (1965). See Inbau, The
Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. Rlv. 442, 460
(1948); Pope, Escobedo, then Miranda, and Now Johnson v. United States, 40 F.R.D.
351, 357 (1966). But note that any legislative action must be within the judicial guide-
posts of the past and future. Craig, To Police the Judges-Not Just Judge the Police,
57 J. Cam. L., C. & P.S. 305, 307 (1966).
85 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
86Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 615 (1869). See also Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879); Kharaiti Ran Samras v. United States, 125 F.2d
879, 881 (9th Cir. 1942).
As early as 1869 the California Supreme Court held that internal police regula-
tions of the states could be controlled by the federal government under the appropriate
legislation clause of the thirteenth amendment. People v. Washington, 36 Cal. 658, 668
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The Supreme Court itself in Miranda suggested that such congressional action
would be welcome and would be appropriate.81 Recogmzmg that it could not
foresee all the possible alternatives which the Congress or the states might
devise,88 the Court did not intend its decision to be taken as the only possible
solution; it did not intend that it should create a "constitutional straightjacket,"
but rather the Court encouraged "Congress and the states to continue their
laudable search for increasing effective ways of protecting the rights of the
individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws."8 9
Concluston
Traditionally the control of police procedure has been a matter of local con-
cern. However, in light of the recent United States Supreme Court decisions, local
control has been superseded in great measure by federal constitutional require-
ments. The fourteenth amendment, as presently interpreted, restricts the actions
of local police in a variety of significant ways. The impetus for this court
action has been an increased concern for the rights of the accused, and an effort
is being made to protect those rights effectively.
These decisions have provided a degree of uniformity never before seen in
American police practice. However, the need for uniformity demands more
than a case-by-case development of rules. In an increasingly mobile society, it is
imperative that each citizen know Is rights in facing interrogation and restraint
by the police of any jurisdiction. Such knowledge is not possible in a system
having fifty-one different patterns of procedure. In addition, if the police of all
jurisdictions were governed by a uniform body of rules, the chances of reversal
of criminal convictions by the United States Supreme Court would be substantially
decreased.
Action by Congress seems to be the best method of achieving uniformity.
This body apparently has the authority to act.90 If it continues its course of mac-
tion a reasonable alternative would be the adoption of the Model Code by the
states.
Richard P Inlander*
(1869). See also Shaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 Htnv. L. REv. 1
(1956) discussing the use of the fourteenth amendment to implement federal control
over state criminal procedure.
8 7 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
88 Ibtd.
89 1bu.
90 See notes 84-89 supra and accompanying text.
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